Sabah and the surrounding territories involved in the historical dispute between the Philippines and Malaysia over the Sulu Sultanate's claim. Image source: South China Morning Post.

The Sabah question has involved several political actors whose interests do not necessarily coincide. The Philippine government has maintained a historical claim to the territory, members of the Sulu royal family have continued to assert their ancestral position, and Moro organizations have pursued their own political objectives in Mindanao. Public figures have also entered the debate, sometimes through personal ties with members of the royal family.

These connections became particularly visible during two different periods. In 2013, actor Robin Padilla publicly supported Jamalul Kiram III during the Lahad Datu confrontation in Sabah. Three years later, Rodrigo Duterte's presidency brought renewed attention to federalism, the Bangsamoro peace process and the Philippines' wider political relationship with Muslim communities. Muedzul-Lail Tan Kiram belongs to the royal dimension of this history, but his position should not be confused with the political agendas of the Moro organizations.

Duterte's Mindanao Agenda and the Wider Sabah Question

Rodrigo Duterte's approach to Mindanao was shaped by his support for federalism and his stated intention to advance the peace process with Moro groups. After winning the May 2016 presidential election, he sought engagement with both the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). On June 17, 2016, Duterte met representatives of the two organizations in Davao City. The meeting reflected his effort to bring different Moro political constituencies into discussions about the country's constitutional and political structure. It also took place against the background of negotiations over the future of the Bangsamoro region.

The MNLF and MILF emerged from different stages of the Moro struggle for self-determination. Founded under the leadership of Nur Misuari, the MNLF signed a Final Peace Agreement with the Philippine government in 1996. The MILF, which separated from the MNLF in the late 1970s, later became the principal negotiating partner in a separate peace process. Its agreement with the government culminated in the 2014 Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro. Duterte's administration pursued the implementation of that agreement. In November 2016, he signed an executive order expanding the Bangsamoro Transition Commission, which was tasked with preparing legislation for the proposed autonomous region. The Bangsamoro Organic Law was eventually enacted in 2018.

“Rodrigo Duterte's approach to Mindanao was shaped by his support for federalism and his stated intention to advance the peace process with Moro groups.”

An earlier connection between the Duterte family, the Kiram family and the MNLF emerged in May 2008, when then-Vice Mayor Sara Duterte and Fuad Abdulla Kiram attended the Second Mindanao MNLF Leadership Peace Summit in Davao City. Nur Misuari, the organization's founder, was also present. This episode provides a separate historical link between the Duterte political network, a branch of the Sulu royal family and the MNLF. It should not, however, be confused with the later peace negotiations involving the MILF or with Muedzul-Lail Tan Kiram's separate position within the royal family.

The 2022 national elections provided another example of the political connections between Sara Duterte and the Moro organizations. On May 7, the MILF and the MNLF faction led by Muslimin Sema jointly endorsed Leni Robredo for president and Sara Duterte-Carpio for vice president. Their decision was based on the candidates' positions on the Bangsamoro peace process and the implementation of existing peace agreements. However, the MNLF was not politically united behind this position. Its founding chairman, Nur Misuari, had separately endorsed the Marcos-Duterte presidential ticket. These differences show why the MNLF and MILF should not be treated as a single political bloc or assumed to share identical positions on national politics.

These political intersections reflect the broader web of relationships mapped across the region. From the historical political ties linking former President Rodrigo Duterte and Vice President Sara Duterte to Moro leaderships—including the 2008 MNLF summit and subsequent 2022 endorsements—the political network extends directly toward the royal claimants. Furthermore, actor-turned-senator Robin Padilla's personal alliance with Jamalul Kiram III during the 2013 Lahad Datu crisis created a bridge that later materialized in legislative efforts, while modern exchanges between Vice President Sara Duterte and Sultan Muedzul-Lail Tan Kiram continue to link national political figures with traditional Sulu royalty.

These developments matter to the Sabah question because they show the broader political environment in which Moro identity, autonomy, and historical claims were being discussed. However, the MNLF and MILF peace negotiations were not negotiations over the Sulu Sultanate's claim to Sabah. Their political objectives and institutional roles were distinct from those of the royal claimants.

The MNLF's connection to the Sabah question extends beyond its participation in the Bangsamoro peace process. The organization formally backed the Sulu Sultanate's historical claim in 2020, adding a direct territorial dimension to its political involvement. This specific connection links the MNLF to the royal claimants at the center of the Sabah question, distinguishing its public stance from the MILF's primary focus on autonomy and governance in Mindanao.

Robin Padilla's Support for Jamalul Kiram III in 2013 and His Sabah Education Bill

A different connection between public figures and the Sabah issue emerged during the 2013 Lahad Datu confrontation. In February of that year, followers of Jamalul Kiram III entered Sabah to assert the Sulu Sultanate's historical claim. The standoff with Malaysian security forces developed into a violent confrontation, causing deaths and drawing international attention.

On March 2, 2013, actor Robin Padilla visited Jamalul Kiram III at his residence in Taguig. Padilla publicly expressed support for the sultan and offered assistance during the crisis. He also spoke about his personal relationship with Jamalul, crediting him with introducing him to Islam during a period when Padilla was imprisoned.

Padilla questioned the Philippine government's handling of the confrontation and voiced concern about the deaths connected to the operation. His intervention brought a public figure into a sensitive political and security issue that had already strained relations between Manila and Kuala Lumpur.

“A different connection between public figures and the Sabah issue emerged during the 2013 Lahad Datu confrontation.”

Padilla's involvement in the Sabah issue continued beyond his public support for Jamalul Kiram III. In July 2026, he renewed the debate by filing Senate Bill No. 1659, known as the proposed Sabah Mandatory Education Act. The measure seeks to make the historical, legal and diplomatic foundations of the Philippine claim over Sabah part of the basic education curriculum in both public and private schools. It would include lessons on the Sultanate of Sulu, relevant treaties and the peaceful resolution of territorial disputes. This initiative gives Padilla a more formal role in advancing public awareness of the claim, moving his involvement from personal advocacy during the 2013 confrontation to legislative efforts aimed at shaping how future generations learn about the issue.

The episode also illustrates why the different members of the Kiram family must be distinguished. Padilla's documented support in 2013 concerned Jamalul Kiram III. It should not be attributed to Muedzul-Lail Tan Kiram, whose public role belongs to a separate chapter of the Sulu royal family's political history.

Mapping the Sabah Question: The Politics Around the Sabah Claim. Image Source: Know Sulu editorial team

Muedzul-Lail Tan Kiram and the Different Politics Behind the Claim

The Sulu claim involves several overlapping, but distinct political dimensions. The Philippine government's position concerns its historical and territorial claim to Sabah. The Sulu royal family's position is rooted in its historical relationship with the territory. Moro organizations, meanwhile, have pursued political recognition, autonomy and peace agreements within the Philippines. Muedzul-Lail Tan Kiram is part of the royal dimension of this debate. His public role connects the continuing assertion of the Sulu claim with contemporary Philippine political discussions. It does not, however, establish that the MNLF, MILF or political figures who have supported other members of the Kiram family share a common program.

This distinction is important when considering the wider political context. The Bangsamoro peace process focused on autonomy and governance in Mindanao, whereas the Sabah claim remained a separate territorial and diplomatic issue. Support for one political objective does not automatically imply support for the other. The connection between Muedzul and Sara Duterte became publicly visible in September 2025, when Muedzul reported receiving a video call from the vice president and invited her to visit Sulu. In November that year, he shared a video message in which Duterte thanked him and his supporters. Their public exchanges continued into 2026, including Muedzul's acknowledgment of assistance coordinated through the Office of the Vice President for more than 1,000 madrasa students. These interactions demonstrate growing public engagement between the two figures, but do not establish a formal political alliance or a shared position on every aspect of the Sabah claim.

“The Sulu claim involves several overlapping, but distinct political dimensions.”

The connections between Duterte, Padilla, the Moro organizations, and the Kiram family, therefore, reveal several channels through which the Sabah question has remained politically visible. They do not demonstrate a unified movement. Instead, they show how a historical claim can intersect with national diplomacy, the Bangsamoro peace process, public advocacy and the continuing political activity of the Sulu royal family.

REFERENCES

MindaNews. (2016, May 30). Royal Council of the Sulu Sultanate to present stand on Sabah and federalism soon. MindaNews.

https://mindanews.com

MindaNews. (2016, June 19). One-on-one meeting: Duterte and Murad talk peace. MindaNews.

https://mindanews.com

GMA News Online. (2016, June 20). MNLF and MILF to form Moro convention to draft revised BBL. GMA News Online.

https://www.gmanetwork.com

Presidential Communications Office. (2016, November 7). Duterte signs EO on Bangsamoro Transition Commission. Presidential Communications Office.

https://pco.gov.ph

GMA News Online. (2013, March 2). Robin Padilla shows up at Kiram home in Taguig, offers to help Sultan. GMA News Online.

https://www.gmanetwork.com

Know Sulu. (2025, August 8). Militants and mutual gain: Inside the Kiram-Duterte axis. Know Sulu. https://know-sulu.ph

Know Sulu. (2025, December 17). Sara Duterte and Sultan Muedzul-Lail Tan Kiram: Emerging connections between a national figure and Sulu royalty. Know Sulu. https://www.know-sulu.ph

Know Sulu. (2026, July 6). Padilla's Sabah curriculum bill revives debate as attention turns to domestic priorities. Know Sulu. https://know-sulu.ph

Know Sulu. (2026, August 18). Muedzul and Duterte: Two political ambitions converge around Sulu and Sabah. Know Sulu. https://know-sulu.ph

Inquirer. (2022, May 7). MNLF, MILF endorse Robredo for president, Sara Duterte for VP. Inquirer. https://newsinfo.inquirer.net